기사
CEOs' Outside Employment Opportunities and the Lack of Relative Performance Evaluation in Compensation Contracts /
- 개인저자
- RAJGOPAL, SHIVARAM ;, SHEVLIN, TERRY ;, ZAMORA, VALENTINA
- 수록페이지
- 1813-1844 p.
- 발행일자
- 2006.08.14
- 출판사
- Blackwell Pub
초록
[영문]Although agency theory suggests that firms should index executive compensation to remove market-wide effects (i.e., RPE), there is little evidence to support this theory. Oyer (2004, Journal of Finance 59, 1619?1649) posits that an absence of RPE is optimal if the CEO's reservation wages from outside employment opportunities vary with the economy's fortunes. We directly test and find support for