[영문]Many scientific and nonscientific activities involve practices ofcounting. Counting is, perhaps, the most elementary of numerical practices: an ability to count is presupposed in arithmetic and other branches of mathematics, and counting also is part of innumerable everyday and specialized activities. Though it is a simple practice when considered abstractly, in specific cases counting can be quite complicated, contentious, and socially consequential. Categorical judgments determine what counts asan eligible case, instance, or datum, and these judgments can be difficult and controversial. By focusing on such difficulties, this article aims to elucidate practices that are crucial for the production and stabilization of natural and social orders. Cases discussed in the article are provisionally divided between counting (nonhuman)things and counting people. Cases of counting thingsinclude scientific practices of counting the number of human chromosomes and forensic procedures for counting matches in DNA profiles. Cases of counting people include estimates of crowd size and counts and recounts of election ballots. Counting people not only is a matter of including an object or person in a class or group, but also involves reciprocal performances in which the counted objects are complicit in, or resistive to, the social production of counts. Variable, and otherwise troubled and contested, instances of counting are used to elucidate the numeropolitics of counting: how assigning numbers to things is embedded in disciplined fields, systems of registration and surveillance, technological checks and verifications, and fragile networks of trust.