In addition to the surge in household debt, various indicators have been identified that youth debt, in particular, is increasing steeply. The government recognized the seriousness and announced measures. However, it is difficult to say that the measures in the making are comprehensive enough. Any workable set of comprehensive measures should be based on statistics and surveys on youth debt,, but related data integration has not been carried out at this time. Temporary measures without accurate diagnosis and analysis can make matters worse, so it is urgent to prepare measures based on sound evidence. In particular, economic problems within the youth generation can have different effects depending on gender, housing, jobs, health, family, region, and education level, so it is important to understand the differences and design customized support policies. In addition, the effectiveness of the policy can be ensured when individual support is combined with measures to reduce factors that generate debt. It is necessary to proceed with a long-term and continuous stance in that solving the youth debt problem is connected to social structural changes and points of change in perception of finance beyond the problems of individual youth.
Social problems surrounding the youth, such as the increased youth unemployment rate, youth income poverty and youth housing poverty, have become more evident due to the impact of COVID-19. Youth have difficulty accumulating assets due to the economic downturn and their unstable employment situations, low income and their being new relatively new to the labor market. However, it should be noted that inequality exists even among the youth population. Although policies targeting youth are being implemented, such as the enactment of the Basic Youth Act and the establishment of the first basic youth policy plan for 2020, there is still a high demand for more policies for youth. In order to connect policies to diverse and heterogeneous young individuals, it is necessary to examine the pattern of inequality within the youth generation. Therefore, this study examines the current status of inequality among youth in terms of labor market, income, and assets, and discusses implications for policy.
In addition to the surge in household debt, various indicators have been identified that youth debt, in particular, is increasing steeply. The government recognized the seriousness and announced measures. However, it is difficult to say that the measures in the making are comprehensive enough. Any workable set of comprehensive measures should be based on statistics and surveys on youth debt,, but related data integration has not been carried out at this time. Temporary measures without accurate diagnosis and analysis can make matters worse, so it is urgent to prepare measures based on sound evidence. In particular, economic problems within the youth generation can have different effects depending on gender, housing, jobs, health, family, region, and education level, so it is important to understand the differences and design customized support policies. In addition, the effectiveness of the policy can be ensured when individual support is combined with measures to reduce factors that generate debt. It is necessary to proceed with a long-term and continuous stance in that solving the youth debt problem is connected to social structural changes and points of change in perception of finance beyond the problems of individual youth.
The severity of housing situations of young people is a global concern, with the exacerbating of young people’s housing problems in tenure security, affordability, and adequate housing. Young people aged 19~34 live with their parents, partner, non-relatives, or alone. Based on their living arrangement, young people face different housing conditions, issues, and needs in terms of housing rights. It implies the necessity of a policy approach that takes the diversity of young households into account and strengthens the government’s role in protecting their housing rights.
This paper examines the youth policy delivery system and participatory governance. In the vertical structure of the youth policy delivery system, support from the central government is provided in a segmented manner and does not allow comprehensive and systematic access. In addition, there is a lack of link between local governments, especially between metropolitan and lower tier municipalities. In the horizontal structure of the youth policy delivery system, however, the central government has just begun establishing youth participation committees, and the local governments are experiencing various problems related to public-private partnership in the process of operating local youth centers. This paper suggests that the central government needs to organize a delivery system that can function as a gateway, and to reinforce participatory governance. Local governments need to clearly define the functions and role of local youth centers and find ways to engage youth in operating committees for local youth centers.
The government has been seeking support measures to alleviate old-age poverty, but the level of poverty among the elderly remains high. Considering the pace at which the population is aging, it is necessary to implement an old-age income protection policy that is both financially sustainable and effective in reducingpoverty among the elderly. The primary income and private transfer as a share of income in the elderly has decreased, while the share of public transfer income is increasing. As a result, the income distribution of the elderly tends to increase from the lowest level to the middle level. Representative retirement income security systems such as the National Pension, Basic Pension, National Basic Livelihood Security System, and the Elderly Job Project have limitations as a means of guaranteeing old-age income. Rather than a uniform approach to the old-age income security system, it is necessary to strengthen the old-age income security system in the form of a multi-layered system or package through an approach by age and income standard.
This study estimates the social cost of isolation from the psychological and economic aspects. As of 2019, the proportion of the isolated population in Korea who reported having no one to turn to in times of trouble was 21.7%, the highest among OECD member countries. Results from the analysis using the Gallup World Poll data suggest that someone who has been isolated without anyone to turn to help needs 4.79 times as much as his or her household income to restore his or her previous life satisfaction level. It is estimated to cost as much as 1.5 billion Korean won to support someone who begins living a socially-isolated life at the age of 25 and remains isolated without taking part in the labor market. As we preparing for the post-COVID-19, social isolation becomes a new social risk, and it is time for our society to actively pay attention.
